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Wholly Owned Subsidiary Versus 
Technology Licensing in the Worldwide 
Chemical Industry 
This paper empirical1y analyzes the 
determinants of the choice between 
whol1y owned subsidiary and tech-
nology licensing as a strategy for 
expansion abroad. We use a new 
and comprehensive database on 
worldwide plant level investments 
in the chemical industry during the 
1981-1991 periodo We find that both 
cultural distance and the presence 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalization has underlined the need 
far firms to exploit technological capa-
bilities on a global scale. Indeed, during 
the last decades firms have increasingly 
committed themselves to global markets. 
This has coincided with a surge in the 
worldwide flows of fareign direct invest-
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of other potential licensors favor 
the use of licensing as a s tra tegy for 
expanding abroad, whereas, prior 
experience favors the choice of 
whol1y owned subsidiary. An impli-
cation of this study is that competi-
tion in the market for technology 
can foster the international diffu-
sion of technology through the use 
of arm's length agreements. 
ment, which passed $600 billion in 
1998, a rise in cross-barder licensing 
agreements, and a growth in the number 
of international alliances (World Invest-
ment Repart, 1999). 
Understanding the factars that condi-
tion the choice of the international ex-
pansion mode is an important challenge 
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in the field of international business, and 
a critical determinant of the likely suc-
cess of the foreign project. We follow in 
this tradition and focus specifically on 
whether technological competencies are 
exploited in foreign markets through li-
censing agreements or wholly owned 
subsidiaries. These two alternatives lie 
at the extremes of a continuum of gover-
nance structures ranging from a hierar-
chy to a market mechanism (Williamson, 
1991). 
Despite the considerable body of the-
oretical work (see literature review in the 
next section), there are relatively few 
empirical studies that address this topic 
in a comprehensive way. (Contractor and 
Kundu, 1998, is a recent exception.) This 
is mainly due to the difficulty in collect-
ing data that are appropriate to test the 
hypotheses. Our research uses data on 
investment projects in the chemical in-
dustry worldwide. This is a new and rich 
database that has not been explored in 
previous studies of entry mode choice. 
Although limited to one sector, it has the 
virtue of being comprehensive, covering 
the universe of projects undertaken all 
over the world for a large number of 
years. This allows us both to control ex-
tensively for many sources of heteroge-
neity in the data and to make a more 
robust test of some of the determinants of 
the entry mode choice. In addition, the 
chemical industry constitutes a natural 
test-bed for analyzing these issues be-
cause it is both a technology-based in-
dustry and a global industry. 
This paper attempts to shed light on 
some outstanding questions in this area 
of research. Specifically: (1) Does cul-
tural distance influence the choice be-
tween wholly owned subsidiary and 
technology licensing? (2) Do firms learn 
from previous business practices in for-
eign countries? And, which entry mode 
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does provide more experiential learning 
to the investor? (3) How does the pres-
ence of other potential licensors influ-
ence the entry mode choice? The first 
two issues have been analyzed exten-
sively by scholars in the field of interna-
tional business. However, as we shall 
discuss later, the empirical findings are 
mixed and have not provided a clear-cut 
answer. The role of the distribution of 
technological competencies has received 
very little attention. Yet, the strategic im-
peratives conditioning the choice be-
tween wholly owned subsidiary and li-
censing depend on whether or not the 
firm possesses unique and "difficult to 
replicate" technological capabilities. 
Our paper offers new and interesting in-
sights about the relationship between 
competition in technology and entry 
mode choice. 
BACKGROUND 
Forty years ago, Hymer (1960) raised 
the question of why multinational firms 
existed at all given the presumed penal-
ties for operating across national and 
cultural boundaries. The logic put for-
ward by Hymer still remains persuasive: 
The multinational must bring some in-
herent advantages that potentially con-
stitute an important edge over local com-
petitors. The principal belief of the the-
ory of foreign direct investment is that 
the primary advantage that a firm brings 
to foreign markets is its possession of 
superior knowledge about technology, 
production, marketing or other activi-
tieso 
Although "locational" considerations, 
such as tariffs, transport costs or compar-
ative advantages, could mandate that the 
firm not concentrate all operations in 
one country and export to others (Root, 
1987), it still remained to explain why 
foreign direct investment should be pre-
¡OURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES 
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ferred to the arm's length use of markets. 
The "eclectic theory" (Dunning, 1981) 
pointed to "internalization" advantages. 
Applying the insights of the transaction 
cost theory (Williamson, 1991), this ap-
proach suggests that, absent significant 
contracting hazards, the 'default' low-
cost governance mechanism is a simple 
contract. However, writing and execut-
ing a reliable contract for the use of tech-
nology requires adequate specification of 
property rights, monitoring and enforce-
ment of contractual terms - any ofwhich 
may be problematic (Contractor, 1981; 
Teece, 1988). 
An interesting twist to this approach is 
provided by Kogut and Zander (1993). 
They argue that "multinational corpora-
tions arise not out of the failure of mar-
kets for buying and selling knowledge, 
but out of its superior efficiency as an 
organizational vehicle by which to trans-
fer this knowledge across borders." Al-
though theoretically different, their ap-
proach leads to conclusions and impli-
cations that are empirically equivalent to 
the ones generated by the transaction 
cost theory. Indeed, they posit that the 
nature of the knowledge, or technology, 
is the main determinant of the choice of 
the mode of international expansiono If 
the knowledge is tacit, complex and dif-
ficult to teach then - they argue - intra-
firm transfers of knowledge are easier 
than inter-firm transfers. However, it is 
exactly when knowledge is tacit and 
complex that contracting upon it be-
comes more problematic and transaction 
costs are the largest (Teece, 1977; Bal-
akrishnan and Koza, 1993; van Hippel, 
1994). 
Another important contribution comes 
from the behavioral theory of the firm, 
which adds a dynamic component to the 
earlier picture. The underlying assump-
tion is that firms stay clase to their past 
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practices and routines (Cyert and March, 
1963) and therefore the process of inter-
nationalization can only be gradual and 
sequential (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
Firms operating internationally face 
large uncertainty, to which they respond 
with a sequential strategy. The so-called 
U-model (Uppsala) of internationaliza-
tion of the firm maintains that in this 
slow process of sequential steps the firm 
oriented towards globalization learns 
habits, preferences, and the market 
structure of the target countries (Johan-
son and Vahlne, 1977). This experiential 
knowledge is a critical resource since it 
is country-specific and it cannot be eas-
ily transferred between firms or business 
units. 
The U-model emphasizes two aspects. 
First, that firms move to distant coun-
tries only after having established a pres-
ence in more proximate countries. In-
deed, the firm's experiential knowledge 
derived from the domestic market is of 
limited value in markets located at a 
great psychic distance (Davidson, 1983; 
Kogut and Singh, 1988). Therefore, the 
psychic distance between the home and 
foreign markets affects market selection 
as well as the choice of the entry mode. 
Second, the U-model predicts a sequen-
tial increase of commitments through 
different stages (establishment chain) as 
long as the firm learns about the foreign 
market. This process goes through ex-
ports first, then the establishment of a 
marketing subsidiary and concludes 
with the creation of overseas production 
facilities (Benito and Grisprud, 1992; 
Eriksson et al., 1997). 
Finally, a more recent approach is pro-
vided by the "syncretic" theory of the 
entry mode choice. This approach, de-
veloped by Hill, Hwang and Kim (1990) 
and Contractor (1990), focuses on the 
different level of control, resource com-
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mitment and dissemination risk in-
volved respectively in licensing and 
wholly owned subsidiaries (joint ven-
tures are classified as an intermediate 
choice between these two extremes). 
Specifically, licensing gives weaker con-
trol over the strategic decisions concern-
ing the foreign operation, it requires 
fewer dedicated assets, and it implies a 
much larger risk that firm-specific ad-
vantages in know-how will be dissemi-
nated. This approach suggests that stra-
tegic variables, environmental variables 
and transaction-specific variables can 
play a role in shaping the decision be-
tween licensing and wholly owned sub-
sidiary. 
HYPOTHESES 
Cultural Distance 
Globalized firms need to know how to 
run businesses in the host country to 
exploit their technological advantages 
and competencies at full effect. The 
greater the distance in values, customs 
and behaviors between their home coun-
try and the host country, the more diffi-
cult it is for foreign investors to operate 
successfully in the host country (Hof-
stede, 1980; Hennart and Larimo, 1998). 
Indeed, the routines and administrative 
structures that firms develop to manage 
domestic market operations are unlikely 
to be very sensitive to the signals flowing 
from culturally different business envi-
ronments (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
However, the importance of cultural 
distance changes according to the way 
international businesses are organized 
(Hofstede, 1991). A wholly owned sub-
sidiary requires the coordination of the 
foreign affiliate through expatriate man-
agers, who have to live and work follow-
ing the foreign customs. Instead a licens-
ing contract is much les s demanding in 
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terms of acculturation. For example, the 
firm need not learn how to deal with 
suppliers or potential customers. The lo-
cal licensee already possesses this 
knowledge. Indeed, the U-model explic-
itly postulates a positive relationship be-
tween the knowledge of the rules, norms 
and values of the foreign market and the 
level of resource commitment (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977). These observations 
lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Cultural distance reduces the pro-
pensity of a firm to set up a wholly 
owned subsidiary rather than using li-
censing to exploit technological com-
petencies in a foreign country. 
The importance of cultural distance 
has been tested in several studies. 
Kogut and Singh (1988) found that 
greater cultural distance increased the 
probability that greenfield joint ven-
tures would be preferred to wholly 
owned greenfields and to controlling 
acquisitions. Barkema, Bell and Pen-
nings (1996) showed that the longevity 
of foreign ventures was negatively re-
lated to cultural distance. Hennart and 
Larimo (1998), in their comparative 
study of Japanese and Finnish invest-
ment in the US, found that greater cul-
tural distance made more likely entry 
through shared-equity ventures. How-
ever, Contractor and Kundu (1998), us-
ing data on the worldwide hotel indus-
try, found no effect of cultural dis-
tance, and Kim and Daniels (1991) 
reported similar results. 
Learning Through Past 
Experience 
Although we focus on the decision 
concerning a single production site, the 
process of penetration in a foreign coun-
try is by its nature a dynamic process 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Firms that 
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expand abroad are likely to acquire 
knowledge about foreign sites, including 
foreign culture, institutional characteris-
tics, and other site-specific knowledge. 
This experiential learning do es not re-
duce the cultural distance between home 
and host country but certainly enhances 
the firm's experience in operating a busi-
ness in a given foreign market (Root, 
1987). A study by Eriksson et al. (1997) 
reported a strong negative relationship 
between both business and institutional 
knowledge and the perceived cost of in-
ternationalization. In other words, expe-
riential learning endows the firm with 
greater ability to detect the opportuni-
ties, reduces the uncertainties of going 
abroad and makes the international in-
vestor more willing to commit a larger 
amount of resources. Consequently, we 
can state the following hypothesis: 
H2: Experience in a given country in-
creases the propensity of a firm to set 
up a wholly owned subsidiary rather 
than using licensing to exploit techno-
logical competencies. 
Contractor and Kundu (1998) found 
that equity-based modes were preferred 
by companies with considerable experi-
ence and existing geographic reach. 
Similarly, Davidson (1983), Franko 
(1989), Gatignon and Anderson (1988) 
observed an increasing propensity to se-
lect wholly owned subsidiaries as expe-
riential knowledge increased. However, 
Benito and Gripsrud (1992) rejected the 
hypothesis that current levels of direct 
investment in culturally remote coun-
tries increased with previous levels of 
foreign direct investment. Davidson and 
McFetridge (1985) showed a decrease in 
the reliance on wholly owned subsidiar-
ies as foreign experience increased. 
Finally, it is plausible that the experi-
ential learning accumulated through 
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past projects in a country depends on the 
form of the project. Projects that involve 
a stronger linkage with the local environ-
ment such as the creation of a wholly 
owned subsidiary or a joint venture with 
a local partner give the firm a more di-
verse and richer experience than a li-
censing arrangement (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). This suggests the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
H3: Firms accumulate more experien-
tial learning from equity investments 
than from licensing contracts. 
Number of Technology Suppliers 
Several studies have investigated the 
relationship between market structure 
and multinational investments (Caves, 
1996). Dne stylized fact seems to emerge: 
foreign direct investments are more 
widespread in les s competitive markets. 
This is also confirmed by the finding that 
multinational investments are largely 
targeted to differentiated and segmented 
industries where competition is les s in-
tense (Grubaugh, 1987). 
This leads to an important consider-
ation: the entry mode strategy cannot be 
analyzed in isolation from what other 
potential competitors do or might do. 
However, liule attention has been de-
voted to this point by scholars in the 
field of international business studies. A 
firm investing in a foreign country is 
concerned with the present value of the 
future flows of profits, which have to be 
larger than the entry costs. Future profits 
are related to potential entrants in the 
market (Porter, 1985). Rival firms (both 
local and international) might be at-
tracted by the presence of profitable 
business es and start entering the market. 
Dbviously an entrant needs to have ac-
cess to the technology in order to start 
the production. All else equal, the more 
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sources of technology (Le. potential li-
censors) there are, the easier is entry 
since technology can be simply bought 
in the market, and more intense the com-
petition (Lieberman, 1987; Arora et al., 
2000). In turn, this would make it more 
difficult to recoup the costs of opening 
up a subsidiary in the foreign market. 
H4: The larger the number of potential 
licensors for the technology employed 
in a given foreign project, the lower 
the propensity of the investor to set up 
a wholly owned subsidiary rather than 
using licensing for that project. 
Testing this hypothesis involves an 
important qualification. As Kogut and 
Zander (1993) have pointed out, market-
based transactions in technology are 
more likely to occur when technologies 
are more codified and easier to transfer 
across organizational boundaries. Teece 
(1977) and Balakrishnan and Koza 
(1993) showed that the costs of transfer-
ring technology to other parties were 
lower in the case of more mature and 
standardized technologies, due to the re-
duced importance of asymmetric infor-
mation and opportunistic behaviors. 
Arora and Gambardella (1994) and von 
Hippel (1994) also suggested that codifi-
cation and standardization of knowledge 
makes technology transfer easier by re-
ducing the difficulties of task-partition-
ing. This means that the number of po-
tentiallicensors might simply be a proxy 
of more fundamental attributes of the 
technology. Accordingly, in our empiri-
cal analysis below, we control for char-
acteristics of the technology such as 
complexity and codifiability to sort out 
these confounding effects. 
MErnODOLOGY 
The unit of analysis of this study is an 
individual project (a chemical plant) un-
560 
dertaken in a foreign market. Our data on 
chemical projects undertaken abroad 
come from the Chemical Age Project File 
(CAPF), which covers aH new chemical 
plants (over 20000) announced aH over 
the world during the 1981-1991 periodo 
The databas e provides the name of the 
company that operated the plant (or the 
names of the partners if the project was 
run under a joint venture) and that ofthe 
firm that licensed the technology. This 
allows us to identify whether, for a 
given project, the firm that ultimately 
possessed the technological capability, 
chose to set up a wholly owned opera-
tion or to adopt a licensing strategy. In 
addition, the database reports for each 
plant the type of process technology that 
was used for production. For instance, it 
is possible to identify all plants that pro-
duced "ammonia" distinguishing them 
from those that produced "acetic acid". 
To clarify terminology, in the reminder 
of the paper, we shall treat aH "ammo-
nia" (or "acetic acid") plants as belong-
ing to the same technology sub-class, 
which we shaH refer to simply as 'tech-
nology'. 
In our empirical analysis we focus on a 
sample of large chemical firms. These 
firms are aH chemical firms from devel-
oped countries that had more than $1 
billion of total turnover by the year 1988 
and at least one investment project dur-
ing the 1981-1991 period in our data-
base. This yields a set of 153 chemical 
firms, of which 68 are North American, 
32 Japanese and 53 West European. We 
restricted our attention to this sample of 
large firms because we had to collect 
firm-specific variables that our database 
did not provide. These firms accounted 
for overseas investment of about $50 bil-
lion ayear during the period under study 
and close to 50% of aH overseas invest-
ment in the chemical industry.l Specifi-
¡OURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES 6
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cally, in the time period, they granted 
1696 international licenses and under-
took 2638 wholly owned foreign 
projects. 
In the econometric analysis below, we 
exploit the time dimension of the data 
and split the investment projects in two 
periods: 1981-1985 and 1986-1991. In 
our sample, there are 1154 wholly 
owned projects and 737 licenses in the 
first period and respectively 1484 and 
959 in the second periodo We run our 
regressions only on projects undertaken 
in the second period and use the first 
period observations to construct sorne of 
the independent variables (see below). 
This allows us to control better for other 
factors that affect the choice between 
wholly owned subsidiary and licensing, 
avoiding potential endogeneity prob-
lems. In sorne of our model specifica-
tions, with the purpose of controlling for 
the nature of technology, we restrict our 
set of projects undertaken abroad to the 
ones belonging to a sample of 136 tech-
nologies. These are the most important 
technologies in chemicals and cover 
about 75% of all projects undertaken 
abroad. 
Variables 
Mode of entry. A wholly owned 
project is a plant abroad for which the 
databas e identifies any ofthe firms of our 
sample as the exclusive owner. Licens-
ing is a plant abroad for which the data-
base reports any of the firms of our sam-
pIe as licensor of the technology, but not 
as owner of the plant. We capture this 
dichotomy in the entry mode through a 
binomial dependent variable that takes 
the value of 1 in case of wholly owned 
project and the value of O in case of li-
censing. 
Cultural distance. (CULTDIST) We 
measure the cultural distance between 
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the home and the host country using the 
four cultural dimension classification 
developed by Hofstede (1980, 1991). For 
a given country-pair, the cultural dis-
tance is calculated as the arithmetic av-
erage of the deviations in Hofstede's four 
dimensions, correcting for the overall 
variance of each of these four dimen-
sions (Kogut and Singh, 1988). 
Experience. We use two separate mea-
sures of experience to capture differ-
ences in the experiential learning accu-
mulated through the different invest-
ment modes chosen for the foreign 
projects. EXP ALL measures experience 
as the total number of projects (of all 
types) in a given country in the five years 
preceding the project under study. EX-
PEQUITY includes only projects which 
involved sorne forms of equity invest-
ment in the foreign country, either 
wholly owned projects or projects oper-
ated jointly with local firms. Using dif-
ferent time spans for measuring experi-
ence yielded similar qualitative results. 
Poientiallicensors. (POTLIC) We want 
to capture the presence of other sources 
of technological competencies. In other 
words, we would like to know how 
many other firms were capable of sup-
plying the technology that was used in a 
given plant. We do so by counting the 
number of firms (excluding the investing 
firm) that licensed a given technology in 
the period 1981-1985. This is a good 
proxy for the number of potential licen-
sors of that technology in the period 
1986-1991. An underlying assumption is 
that technological competencies are sim-
ilar within a given technology and dif-
ferent across technologies. 
Control Variables 
Geographic distance. (PROXIMITY) 
This variable takes the value of 1 when 
the project undertaken abroad is In a 
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country that shares borders with the 
home country or is located within a 100 
mile range. It takes the value of O other-
wise. Geographic closeness implies re-
duced communication costs. Geographic 
distance is generally related to psychic 
distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), 
but they need not coincide. We include 
this variable to check whether cultural 
distance has any effect on the entry 
mode choice in addition to what is ac-
counted for by geographic distance. 
Language. (LANGUAGE) This dummy 
takes the value of 1 if the home and the 
host country have at least one of their 
officiallanguages in common and O oth-
erwise. Having the same language might 
imply reduced communication costs be-
tween foreign operations and headquar-
terso It might also imply an easier adap-
tation process for the expatriates who are 
sent abroad. Davidson (1983) reported 
that U.S.-based firms preferred to enter 
English-speaking countries first. 
Firm síze. (SIZE) We control for firm 
size because investments abroad require 
large financial and managerial resources, 
and expertise to venture into foreign 
markets. Small firms might lack these 
resources (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1989), and this suggests 
a negative relationship between firm size 
and licensing. However, Shane (1996) ar-
gued that the problems of human re-
source selection and management might 
grow even faster than the firm's growth 
in size, especially in international oper-
ations. 
Degree of multinatíonality. (MUL TI) 
This variable reports the number of 
countries in which the firm had directly 
invested in the period 1981-1985. This 
might capture firm experience in dealing 
with international investments. We ex-
pect that the degree of multinationality 
has a positive effect on the probability 
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that the project undertaken abroad is car-
ried out through a wholly owned opera-
tion (Johanson and Valhne, 1977; Erra-
milli and Rao, 1993). 
Market size. (GDP) The size of the for-
eign market can actually influence the 
profitability of the investment and there-
fore the mode of entry in the foreign 
country (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Zejan, 
1990). We use the Barro-Lee database (a 
widely used source of country level data) 
to obtain information about the level of 
GDP in the host countries. GDP has two 
conflicting effects on the choice between 
a wholly owned project and licensing. 
Gn the one hand, a small market may not 
be worth the effort, particularly since 
any learning is likely to have only 
limited applicability (Gomez-Casseres, 
1990). Gn the other hand, a large market 
may also be more competitive, implying 
that licensing may be a more attractive 
strategy. AIso, a larger market may offer a 
larger pool of suitable potential licens-
ees, an important consideration for the 
licensing strategy, particularly in devel-
oping country markets (Contractor, 
1981). 
Tariffs on intermediate inputs and 
capital goods. (GWTI) The existence of 
restrictions to both capital investments 
and trade of inputs might reduce the 
profitability of a direct investment in the 
foreign country (Contractor, 1990; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1990). To capture this 
effect we use the level of tariffs on capi-
tal investments and intermediate inputs, 
from the Barro-Lee database. 
CountIy risk. (NGRISK) The more un-
certain the returns from the project un-
dertaken abroad, the less willing the firm 
is to commit resources (Kim and Hwang, 
1992). This would suggest that countries 
characterized by a higher level of risk 
should attract relatively less wholly 
owned projects and more licensing. We 
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use a measure of country risk developed 
by the International Country Risk Guide. 
For the interpretation of the sign, one 
should be aware that a higher value of 
this variable is associated with les s risk 
in the country. 
Codifiable technology. (CaDIFIABIL-
ITY) Codification makes a technology 
more transparent and easier to value by a 
prospective buyer, thereby reducing the 
information asymmetry problem in tech-
nology transfer (Teece, 1977; Balakrish-
nan and Koza, 1993). Codification also 
makes the knowledge less sticky (von 
Hippel, 1994) and reduces the direct 
costs of information exchange across 
firm boundaries that a licensing agree-
ment would entail (Kogut and Zander, 
1993). We measure the degree of codifi-
ability of the technology using the num-
ber of patents reported for a given te ch-
nology at the US Patent affice over the 
1976-1991 periodo As several authors 
have noted (Teece, 1988; von Hippel, 
1994; Arora and Gambardella, 1994), 
patents are more likely to be issued for 
technologies where the underlying 
knowledge is sufficiently codifiable. 
However, patent data are organized in 
patent classes that are typically much 
coarser than the level of our chemical 
technologies. Therefore, we developed a 
set of queries for collecting the number 
of patents on the 136 chemical technol-
ogies in our sample from the online US 
Patent affice database. 2 
Complex technology. (CaMPLEXITY) 
We use the definition of complexity pro-
vided by Kogut and Zander (1993). Com-
plexity is the number of critical and in-
teracting elements embraced by an entity 
or activity. Hence, a typical "complex" 
technology will show a large number of 
different uses, product and end-use ap-
plications, multiple inputs and compo-
nents. We identified such number 
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through a careful process, supervised by 
a chemist, that involved reading the 
patent abstracts and constructing queries 
to search the US Patent affice online 
database. Complexity makes market-
based technology transactions more dif-
ficult (von Hippel, 1994; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993). Table 1 gives the opera-
tionalization of the explanatory variables 
and shows their predicted signo 
RESULTS 
A First Cut at the Data 
This section is intended to convince 
the reader that the results we obtain from 
our logit regressions are robust to the 
untestable restrictions that parametric 
analysis necessarily imposes on the data. 
We provide here three figures that sup-
port our main hypotheses. We define 
"propensity to internalize" (henceforth 
PI) as the ratio between the number of 
wholly owned projects and the sum of 
licensed and wholly owned projects. An 
increase in this ratio means that we ob-
serve more vertically integrated gover-
nance structures for the projects under-
taken abroad. Notice that PI is not mea-
sured at the level of the firm, but at the 
level of the classes of the explanatory 
variables reported in each of the figures 
below. 
Figure 1 shows how greater cultural 
distance between home and host country 
reduces the likelihood that a foreign 
project is carried out through a wholly 
owned operation rather than by licens-
ing. We have constructed five classes 
that are intended to capture different lev-
els of cultural distance. Classes broadly 
correspond to quintiles. Countries which 
are very similar in Hofstede's four di-
mensions, like United States and Austra-
lia or Germany and Austria, enter in the 
first class labeled "same culture". Coun-
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TABLE 1 
ExPLANATORY VARIABLES, QpERATIONALIZATION AND EXPECTED SIGN 
Independent Expected 
Variable Operationalization Sign 
CULTDIST = (l{lOme - Ihost)2/4 Vi where P, j = 1, 2, 3,4 are four -
cultural indexes from Hofstede (1980) and Vi is the 
variance of the jth indexo 
EXPALL = number of investment projects (all types) in a given + 
country in the 5 years preceding the project under study 
EXPEQUITY = number of equity investments in a given country in the + 
5 years preceding the project under study 
POTLIC = number of licensors (except the investor), 1981-85, in -
the technology sub-class to which the foreign project 
belonged 
PROXIMITY = 1 when the project was undertaken in a country which + 
shares some common borders with the home country; 
= O otherwise 
LANGUAGE = 1 when the home and the host country have at least + 
one of their official languages in common; 
= O otherwise 
GDP = gross domestic product of the country which hosted the +/-
foreign project (Barro-Lee) 
OWTI = level of tariffs on capital investments and intermediate -
inputs of the country which hosted the foreign project 
(Barro-Lee) 
NORISK = weighted measure of the politica!, economic and + 
financial risk of the country which hosted the foreign 
project (International Country Risk Guide) 
SIZE = investor's total turnover by 1988 (Afialion, 1989) +/-
MULTI = number of countries in which the investor had directly + 
invested in the period 1981-85 
CODIFIABILITY = number of patents reported in the U.S. Patent Office -
(1976-1991) in the technology sub-class to which the 
foreign project belonged. Standardized to take values 
between O and 1 
COMPLEXITY = number of different uses, product and end-use + 
applications, multiple inputs and components of the 
technology employed in the foreign project. 
Standardized to take values between O and 1 
tries which are very different in aH four 
dimensions, like Japan and Morocco or 
Sweden and Japan, are in the "opposite 
culture" elass. 3 
eludes aH projects for which the firm had 
no experience in the country in the pre-
ceding five years. The second group con-
tains aH projects for which the investor 
had accumulated sorne 'general' country 
experience, be it from licensing, joint 
ventures, or whoHy owned projects. The 
last group only considers the projects for 
which the firm had accumulated more 
Figure 2 shows the effect of country 
experience on the decision between 
wholly owned project and technology li-
censing. We have divided the observa-
tions in three groups. The first group in-
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'qualified' experiential learning through 
prior investments entailing greater in-
volvement with the foreign country busi-
ness environment such as joint ventures 
or wholly owned projects. The figure un-
derscores that country-specific experi-
ence makes future investments through 
wholly owned projects rather than li-
censing more likely, and this effect is 
more pronounced when the experiential 
learning comes from prior projects en-
FIGURE 2 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCE AND TIJE 
CHOICE BETWEEN WHOLLY OWNED 
PROJECf AND TECHNOWGY 
LlCENSING 
PI 
no country 'general' 'qualified' 
experience counlry counlry 
experience experience 
EXPERIENCE 
VOL. 31, No. 4, FouRTH QUARTER, 2000 
AsmsH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI 
FIGURE 3 
PoTENTIAL UCENSORS AND TIJE 
CHOICE BETWEEN WHOLLY OWNED 
PROJECf AND TECHNOLOGY 
LlCENSING 
0,9 
o,s 
0,7 
PI 9,6 
o,s 
0,4 
0,3 
0,2 
-.. 
-
-
~ 0,83 
-
- -
..--.. 
-
0,72 
- 0,65 r- :i0~.t - - r- 0,53 
- -
1--
B.,Be 1 or 2 3 to 5 , to JO more 1h8R 
10 
NUMBER OF POTENTlAL LlCENSORS 
tailing greater involvement with the for-
eign country business environment. 
Figure 3 shows the influence of the 
number of sources of technological com-
petencies (i.e. the number of potential 
licensors) on the choice between wholly 
owned project and technology licensing. 
We have constructed five different 
elasses ranging from no potential licen-
sors to many. For instance, the last elass 
ineludes all technologies for which we 
counted more than 10 potential licen-
sors. Although the construction of the 
elasses is somewhat arbitrary, experi-
ments with different groupings show no 
significant changes in the results. As ex-
pected, the PI is the largest when there 
are no potential licensors. The PI de-
creases as we move to elasses which in-
elude technologies with a larger number 
of potential licensors. 
Logit Analysis 
The results of the binomial logit re-
gression are presented in Table 2. A pos-
itive coefficient means that the indepen-
dent variable tends to increase the prob-
ability of a wholly owned project, 
whereas a negative coefficient implies 
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TABLE 2 
LOGrr REGRESSIONS: WHOLLY OWNED PROJECT (=1) VERSUS TECHNOLOGY 
LICENSING (=0) 
Variables Modell Model2 Model3 Model4 
Constant 1.705*** 1.492*** -1.719*** -1.719*** 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.578) (0.580) 
CULTDIST -0.372*** -0.316*** -0.234*** -0.204*** 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.060) (0.060) 
EXPALL 0.048*** 0.035*** 
(0.009) (0.010) 
EXPEQUITY 0.100*** 0.082*** 
(0.013) (0.015) 
POTLIC -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.028*** ,-0.029*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
PROXIMITY 1.073*** 1.036*** 
(0.213) (0.214) 
LANGUAGE 0.375* 0.320 
(0.205) (0.205) 
GDP -0.000** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
OWTI -0.764*** -0.689** 
(0.273) (0.272) 
NORISK 0.027*** 0.026*** 
(O.OOS) (0.005) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
MULTI 0.007 -0.004 
(0.017) (0.017) 
CODIFIABILITY -1.097*** -1.093*** 
(0.419) (0.423) 
COMPLEXITY 2.067*** 2.172*** 
(O. 54 S) (0.556) 
Number of obs. 2133 2133 1297 1297 
Log Likelihood -1194.32 -1166.44 -726.S2 -711.77 
Chi-squared 326.73 (3) 382.50 (3) 318.S0 (12) 348.00 (12) 
CorrectIy classified 70.0% 71.1% 73.1% 74.0% 
Notes: 
1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
2. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
the opposite. We have estimated four dif-
ferent model specifications. Models 1 
and 2 only include the explanatory vari-
ables whose sign was predicted by the 
hypotheses we have worked out aboye. 
We have used all projects undertaken 
abroad by the firms of our sample during 
the period 1986-1991 in the sixty coun-
tries for which the measure of cultural 
distance was available. This amounts to 
a total of 2133 projects, of which two 
thirds are wholly owned operations. 
Models 1 and 2 differ in the definition of 
country experience adopted. In model 1, 
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TABLE 3 
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES (OBSERVATIONS = 1297) 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. CULTDIST 1.79 1.35 1.00 
2. EXPALL 6.2211.80 -0.38 1.00 
3. EXPEQUITY 5.2010.61 -0.39 0.99 1.00 
4. POTLIC 10.37 6.02 0.08 -0.07 -0.07 1.00 
5. PROXIMITY 0.17 0.38 -0.23 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 1.00 
6. LANGUAGE 0.25 0.43 -0.54 0.36 0.37 -0.06 0.24 1.00 
7. GDP 904 1290 -0.31 0.62 0.60 -0.08 -0.18 0.15 1.00 
8.0WTI 0.14 0.28 0.11 -0.14 -0.16 0.08 -0.15 0.08 -0.14 1.00 
9. NORISK 75.1016.81 -0.41 0.35 0.35 -0.06 0.20 0.29 0.45 -0.44 1.00 
10. SIZE 8524 6903 -0.13 0.20 0.20 -0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 -0.03 1.00 
11. MULTI 9.02 5.64 -0.16 0.39 0.39 -0.04 -0.06 0.20 0.08 -0.04 0.04 0.66 1.00 
12. CODIFIABILITY 0.71 0.17 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.15 
13. COMPLEXITY 0.61 0.12 0.04 -0.10 -0.11 0.18 
EXP ALL measures experience as the 
number of projects (of all types) in a 
given country in the five years preceding 
the project under consideration. In 
model 2, EXPEQUITY includes only eq-
uity investments. Models 3 and 4 still 
maintain the above mentioned differ-
ence in the measure of country experi-
ence, and add several control variables. 
In particular, the inclusion of variables 
such as CODIFIABILITY and COMPLEX-
ITY allows us to control more carefully 
for the nature of the technology, an im-
portant determinant of the entry mode 
choice (Kogut and Zander, 1993). More-
over, our explanatory variable, POTLIC, 
might simply be a proxy for the degree of 
maturity and standardization ofthe tech-
nology. Indeed, it is likely that we ob-
serve more potential licensors in tech-
nologies where the underlying knowl-
edge base is more codified, beUer 
understood, and hence easier to transfer 
across firms. Therefore, the use of con-
trols for the nature of technology should 
allow us to iso late the true effect of POT-
LIC from spurious sources of variation. 
For this reason, we focused on a sub-set 
of 136 technologies, for which we were 
VOL. 31, No. 4, FOURTH QUARTER, 2000 
0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.10 -0.15 -0.02 1.00 
0.03 -0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.11 0.26 1.00 
able to compute the variables CODIFI-
ABILITY and COMPLEXITY. This re-
duces to 1297 the number of projects 
considered in models 3 and 4, of which 
57% are wholly owned operations. No-
tice that a model including only our con-
trol variables would explain around 15% 
of the variability in the data. However, 
the purpose of including control vari-
ables is to separate what might be con-
founding effects on the true coefficients 
of the explanatory variables. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that greater cul-
tural distan ce increases the preference 
for licensing agreements. The parameter 
estímate of the effect of cultural distance 
(CULTDIST) is negative and highly sig-
nificant in all specifications (p < 0.01). 
This supports Hypothesis 1. Notice that 
in models 3 and 4 we have introduced 
the variables PROXIMITY and LAN-
GUAGE, both showing the expeeted pos-
itive signo As we discussed above these 
variables might be partially correlated 
with CULTDIST. Table 3 reports correla-
tion coefficients of respectively -0.54 
and -0.23. Indeed, when these variables 
are included, the magnitude of the effeet 
of CUL TDIST shrinks, thereby confirm-
567 13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
WHOLLY DWNEn SUBSIDIARY VERSUS LICENSING 
ing that in part cultural distance can be 
proxied by geographic distance and com-
mon language. However, it is worth not-
ing that CUL TDIST still maintains a neg-
ative and significant effect over and 
aboye what is accounted for by geo-
graphic distance and common language. 
Further, to check the robustness of this 
finding, we have performed several ex-
periments (not reported here), for in-
stance excluding from our regressions aH 
investment projects in Japan and US in-
vestment projects in Canada, that might 
have driven the resulto The coefficient of 
CULTDIST reduces its magnitude, but 
keeps its negative and significant signo 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms learn 
from previous experience and this learn-
ing contributes to reduce the cost of a 
whoHy owned project in a foreign coun-
try. Regardless of the measure of experi-
ential learning used (EXPALL or EX-
PEQUITY), the coefficient ofthe variable 
is positive and highly significant (p < 
0.01), which supports the prediction of 
Hypothesis 2. Further, the estimated co-
efficient of EXPEQUITY is larger than 
that of EXPALL, with the marginal effect 
calculated at the means of the regressors 
being twice as large (0.02 versus 0.008 in 
models 3 and 4 respectively). Put differ-
ently, doubling the average level of ex-
perience would increase the probability 
of observing a wholly owned project by 
0.049 in the case of EXPALL and by 
0.094 in the case of EXPEQUITY. In ad-
dition, models 2 and 4 fit the data better 
than do models 1 and 3 respectively. 
This supports Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 suggests that a larger 
number of potential licensors makes it 
more difficult to recover the cost of the 
investment since entry by competitors is 
more likely (there is no exclusivity in the 
technological competencies). In turn, 
this implies that when the number of 
568 
potentiallicensors is large, a firm prefers 
to use technology licensing rather than 
setting up a wholly owned project. Con-
sistent with Hypotheses 4, the coefficient 
of POTLIC is negative and highly signif-
icant (p < 0.01). We would like to em-
phasize that POTLIC remains negative 
(although of smaller magnitude) and sig-
nificant also in models 3 and 4 where we 
have controlled for many of the different 
sources of heterogeneity in our data, and 
in particular for the nature of the tech-
nology. Our results support the idea that 
more tacit and complex technologies are 
more difficult to transfer through market-
based transactions. In addition, they also 
suggest that POTLIC is not merely a sur-
rogate for the degree of standardization 
of the technology. 
The signs of the other variables are 
reasonable. Economic, financial and po-
litical risks and barriers on capital in-
vestments and intermediate goods in-
crease the probability of licensing. GDP 
has a small negative effect on the proba-
bility of observing a wholly owned 
project, indicating that the large market 
benefits of the value of learning do not 
fully balance the availability of suitable 
licensees and the increased toughness of 
competition. The total turnover of the 
firm (SIZE) does not have a significant 
effect, and neither does the international 
experience of the investor (MULTI). 
Finally, we would like to underline 
that we have tested the robustness of 
these results by extending our analysis 
to joint ventures. Indeed, we have run 
both multinomial and ordered logit re-
gressions (not reported here), includ-
ing in the definition of the dependent 
variable a category for the foreign 
projects that were characterized by a 
joint ownership with local partners. 
Overall, the results were consistent 
with those in Table 3, with joint ven-
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tures appearing as an intermediate case 
between wholly owned projects and li-
censing. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study offers sorne fresh evi-
dence on a crucial strategic decision by 
firms involved in global competition: 
When is licensing preferred to a wholly 
owned subsidiary for exploiting tech-
nological competencies abroad? To ad-
dress this question we used a new da-
tabase that covers all chemical plants 
constructed or under construction 
worldwide during the 1981-1991 pe-
riod. We developed a sample of the 
overseas investments and licenses of 
the largest 153 chemical firms in the 
world. Although confined to one in-
dustry, our data set is rich and compre-
hensive. In addition, we believe that 
the results from the chemical industry 
can provide insights into other scale 
and technology intensive industries. 
Another strength of our analysis comes 
from the large number of firms' nation-
ality included in our sample. By focus-
ing on an industry, we can better con-
trol for differences in technology char-
acteristics, such as codifiability and 
complexity, which is much more diffi-
cult in cross-industry studies. Finally, 
another important contribution of this 
paper is the analysis of the role of com-
petition among technology suppliers in 
conditioning the choice of the mode of 
entry. 
We find that cultural distance is an 
important limitation to the commit-
ment of resources. Firms prefer to ex-
ploit their technological competencies 
through licensing when the target 
country is culturally distant from the 
home country. Our results also support 
the idea that learning influences the 
choice of the mode of foreign opera-
VOL. 31, No. 4, FOURTH QUARTER, 2000 
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tion. We find that prior experience in 
the host country increases the odds 
that the project is carried out through a 
wholly owned operation rather than li-
censing. Fllrther, this experience is 
more valuable when it comes from 
prior projects that entail a greater de-
gree of involvement with the foreign 
business environment such as joint 
ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Our results also shed light on an-
other research question that has been 
little explored empirically. Although it 
is widely accepted that a firm's expan-
sion strategy cannot be analyzed in iso-
lation, empirical studies on entry 
modes have typically ignored this 
point. We find that the presence of 
other sources of technological compe-
tencies favor the use of licensing vis-
a-vis wholly owned projects. This is 
consistent with the idea that when 
there are many sources of technological 
competencies, the lack of technology 
does not constitute a barrier to entry. 
Indeed, an entrant does not need nec-
essarily to develop the technology in 
order to start production because it can 
acquire it from any of the potential li-
censors. In turn, this is likely to make 
competition in the product market 
more intense and favor the use of li-
censing as foreign entry mode, which is 
less demanding in terms of resources 
and commitment. 
As a byproduct, this paper supports 
the finding in Kogut and Zander (1993), 
namely that the nature of technology 
plays a critical role in the choice of the 
internationalization strategy of the tech-
nology holder. Indeed, we find that codi-
fiability of technology encourages licens-
ing. By contrast, technologies that are 
more complex tend to be transferred 
through internal rather than market-
based transactions. 
569 15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY VERSUS LICENSING 
NOTES 
1. This estimate is computed using the 
average cost of investment in a given 
chemical project, slightly more than 
$100 million. 
2. We selected all relevant patents using 
a keyword search with the process as key-
word. From these, we selected and read 
the full abstracts of patents that exactly fit 
our criterion. The patent classes (and sub-
classes) into which these patents were 
classified were examined to ensure that 
the invention was in fact a technology in-
vention. These sub-classes of the US 
patent classification system were used 
along with the process name as the basis 
for Boolean queries of the US patent data-
base to generate the final set of patents, 
one set for each technology. (The details of 
the Boolean queries are available upon re-
quest.) The titles (and sorne abstracts se-
lected at random) of the patents in the final 
sample for each technology were exam-
ined to ensure that the final sample did not 
contain irrelevant patents. 
3. Notice that cultural distance should 
playa weaker role in chemicals (industrial 
products) vis-a-vis consumer product in-
dustries. This is true insofar the under-
standing of consumers' relationships is 
concerned. However, the costs of accultur-
ation for expatriate managers, the costs of 
understanding business practices rooted 
in a different culture or the costs of net-
working with the local context are likely to 
be important for industrial product indus-
tries as well. 
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